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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
VERNE J. OBERHANSLEY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8450 
II 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Plaintiff accepts the defendant's statement of issues with 
this one explanation: The jury was dismissed at the request 
of both parties; therefore, the judgment should not be dis-
turbed if either plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law or a jury question was presented on both or either 
issues. Only if defendant was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law should the judgment entered by the district 
court be reversed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this statement of facts, the parenthetical references 
are to pages in the transcript. The parties will be referred 
to as plaintiff and defendant, and LaMar Pearce will be 
called ''LaMar''. 
Plaintiff is unwilling to accept defendant's statement of 
facts. We believe that the following facts are important to 
a determination of this case: 
Facts on Employment Issue 
At the time of the accident, LaMar Pearce Auto Mart, 
a corporation, hereinafter called corporation, was insolvent. 
Two cars which the company held on consignment from an 
Evanston, Wyoming company were to be returned as a part 
of winding up the business ( 4 7). In order to avoid the ex-
pense of hiring someone to drive one of the cars to Evanston, 
LaMar asked plaintiff to do so because he knew plaintiff 
would not charge him ( 3 5). On two prior occasions, plaintiff 
had driven cars to points in Idaho for the corporation and 
had not asked for nor received either wages or reimbursement 
for expenses ( 3 5, 19 2, 19 3) . Plaintiff had never worked 
for the corporation or LaMar and he had his own business 
( 191). On this occasion, when requested by phone to take 
time away from work to assist him, plaintiff told LaMar he 
would do so on one condition-that it not cost him any money; 
that he wasn't going to dig into his own resources to defray 
the costs of the trip ( 194). LaMar then told plaintiff he 
would give him $10.00 to defray expenses-pay for gasoline 
and meals ( 19 5). LaMar, on behalf of the corporation, ac-
cepted plaintiff's services as a favor from one friend to 
another, a neighborly, friendly act ( 3 7, 43), and he did not 
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consider he had the right to boss plaintiff in driving the car 
( 42). His only interest was getting the cars to Evanston 
( 38). Plaintiff had no purpose in going to Evanston other 
than rendering the favor to LaMar and his brother ( 38). The 
corporation maintained Workmen's Compensation and other 
state and federal reports on it~. employees. The plaintiff was 
not listed as an employee at any time on any such report 
( 45). The arrangement for driving the car was a casual and 
gratuitous arrangement ( 46). Plaintiff put gas and oil in 
the three cars (one to be used by LaMar to return the three 
men to Ogden) at a cost of $5.40 ( 19 5), bought lunches for 
all three men at Echo Junction, bought dinner for all three 
at Evanston (198, 199), and spent in excess of the $10.00 
(205). 
Facts on Lack of Cooperation Issue 
I 
LaMar's Conduct. Following the accident, the bu;:,Iness 
of the corporation ended and LaMar left Ogden for California 
to seek employment (57). He was in debt in Ogden and he 
left his address with several people, including an attorney, 
Morgan Wixom, but asked them not to make it public except 
if necessary (58, 66). Before leaving Ogden, he had advised 
defendant of the suit, delivered the summons to it, appeared 
on request at the office of its attorney ( 98) and given on 
request a written statment to its agent (57, 72, 115, 117). He 
went to work at Antioch, California, as a used car salesman 
for the Ford dealer. Two months before trial, he received a 
registered letter from his attorney, hired for him by de-
fendant in accordance with the policy requirement, advising 
him of the trial date and of the necessity that he be present. 
In response to that letter he called his father in Ogden and 
asked him to call the attorney and advise him that, because 
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of his employment situation, it was impossible for him to 
come to Ogden at the time set for the trial ( 49). He later 
received a call from his father, telling him it was important 
that he come, and he then received a letter from another at-
torney, Wixom, advising him he should come. He failed to 
appear at the trial. 
At the time in question, LaMar was a used car manager 
and he was in line to become general manager or new car 
manager ( 49) . He made that promotion not long after the 
trial was held ( 49). As defendant's witness in the trial of 
this garnishment suit, he testified that leaving his work to at-
tend the trial would have jeopardized his chance for this 
promotion (51) . The trial could not have come at a worse 
time for him, he said ( 60). LaMar, a layman, thought the 
statement he had given the defendant company was sufficient 
and
1 
he assumed that after advising the attorney that he could 
not make the November trial date, he would perhaps receive 
a letter from him suggesting a future date ( 65), or that an 
agent from the Oakland, California office of the defendant 
company would contact him if it was important that he be 
there (67, 80). 
Conduct of the Defendant. Upon being notified of the 
suit, the defendant took over the defense in accordance with 
its policy. Upon being advised by Attorney Wixom of 
LaMar's address, defendant wrote LaMar a registered letter, 
advising him of the trial date and of the necessity of his 
presence. Defendant then received a call from Pearce, Sr., 
father of LaMar, advising it in effect that LaMar had re-
ceived the letter but his employment situation made it ab-
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
solutely impossible for him to come to Ogden at the time set 
for the trial ( 81, 83). After being thus advised of the dif-
ficulty of LaMar's position, it ( 1) asked the father to tell 
LaMar that it was important that he be here in Ogden, and 
(2) asked Attorney Wixom, who was not representing LaMar 
in any way in connection with this matter, to write him and 
ask him to appear on the date set. 
Defendant company had a local claims office in Oakland, 
California ( 184), about forty miles from Antioch~ The 
Oakland agent regularly covered Antioch and could have con-
tacted LaMar without going out of his way ( 185), but the 
defendant did not deem it advisable to do so ( 185). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
The Court did not err in Entering its Finding No. 5 
POINT II. 
The Court did not err in Entering its Finding No. 6 
Defendant in its brief has listed five points of argument; 
however, if its Points I and II are not well taken, then it fol-
lows that its Points III, IV, and V are not well taken. There-
fore, we will limit our argument to Points I and II as stated in 
defendant's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
The Court did not err in Entering its Finding No. 5 
For convenience of treatment, argument on this point will 
be divided into the following three issues: 
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1. Plaintiff's injuries were not covered by the Utah 
Workmen's Compensation Act. 
2. Plaintiff was not an employee under the common 
law. 
3. In any event, plaintiff was not an employee within 
the meaning of that word as used in defendant's 
policy of insurance issued to LaMar Pearce Auto 
Mart. 
We think the second issue above is not determinative of this 
case; however, since it has been treated by defendant in its 
brief, we shall answer it herein. 
1. Plaintiff's injuries were not covered by the Utah Work-
men's Compensation Act. Defendant's argument on this 
issue may be summarized as follows: 'cThe Workmen's Com-
pensation Act excludes only employees whose work is both 
casual and not in the regular course of the employer's business. 
Conceding plaintiff's employment was casual, still it was in 
the regular course of the business of LaMar Pearce Auto 
Mart; therefore plaintiff was an employee within the Act at 
the time of his injuries." We submit that this argument as-
sumes the relationship in issue. We submit that the im-
portant question is whether or not plaintiff was an employee 
within the meaning of that word as used in the Act, and that 
definition is contained in Section 35-1-43, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, as follows: 
"'Employees', 'workmen' and 'operatives' defined-
Casual employn1ent-Mining lessees and sublessees-
Partnership members; -The words 'employee', 'work-
men' and 'operative', as used in this title, shall be 
construed to mean: 
" ( 2) Every person, except agricultural laborers 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and domestic servants, in the service of any 'employer' 
as defined in subdivision (2) of section 35-1-42, who 
employs one or more workmen or operatives regularly 
in the same business, or in or about the same estab-
lishment, under any contract of hire, express or im-
plied, oral or written, including aliens, and minors 
whether legally or illegally working for hire, but not 
including any person whose employment is but casual 
and not in the usual course of trade, business or oc-
cupation of his employer." 
We have italicized the words "under any contract of 
hire" in the above definition because we believe they are 
determinative of this issue. Black's Law Dictionary, 2nd 
Edition, defines the word "hire" as follows: 
"To engage in service for a stipulated reward, as to 
hire a servant for a year or laborers by the day or 
month; to engage a man to temporary service for 
wages." 
The Utah Court has in several cases ruled that the de fin-
ition given in the Workmen's Compensation Act requires that 
the person performing the service receive consideration there-
for-that is, be paid a wage or salary. Thus in Bingham City 
Corporation vs. Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 390, 243 P. 
113, the court, after pointing out that it is necessary that some 
consideration be in fact paid or payable to the employee, 
said: 
"The purpose of the act is to provide compensation 
for earning power, lost in industry, and the only basis 
for computing compensation is the earning ability of 
the employee in the particular employment out of 
which the loss arises. In short, the term 'employee' 
indicates a person hired to work for wages as the em-
ployer may direct." 
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Now, plaintiff was not a person hired to work for wages 
as LaMar Pearce Auto Mart might direct. He did receive 
$10.00, it is true, but he received that $10.00 to defray the 
costs of the expense of the trip-it was expense money, and 
it was so considered by the two parties involved There is 
no suggestion in the transcript that Pearce gave the $10.00 
or that plaintiff accepted it as wages or compensation for 
the service to be rendered. Since plaintiff received no com-
pensation for this service, it is clear he was not an employee 
within the Workmen's Compensation Act, and the question 
of whether or not the service rendered was casual or whether 
or not it was a part of the regular business of LaMar Pearce 
Auto Mart becomes immaterial. 
2. Plaintiff was not an employee of LaMar Pearce Auto 
Mart under the common law. As previously stated, we think 
this issue is not determinative, but we shall treat of it, none-
theless. On page 15 of its brief, defendant asks us to assume 
that plaintiff, while driving the car from Ogden to Evanston, 
had negligently injured a third person, and asks: 
"Can anyone doubt that the injured party could have 
recovered judgment against the auto mart?" 
We think probably the third person could not have recovered 
against the auto mart under the assun1ed facts for the reason 
that the U tab court in similar circumstances has so ruled. 
The case of Dowsett vs. Dowsett, 116 Utah 12, 207 P. 2d 809, 
is the Utah case most nearly in point that we have been able 
to find. In this case, Darwin Dowsett was in the Army, 
stationed in Texas. He wanted his wife to join him and bring 
the automobile from Salt Lake City. She did not drive, so 
he requested his mother and father to drive the car down, 
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with the wife riding as a passenger. The mother and father 
were to take turns driving the car, and on the way, with the 
father driving, there was an accident. The mother sued the 
son, claiming the father was his agent in driving the auto-
mobile, and that the son was liable under respondeat superior. 
The Third District Court granted a motion dismissing the 
case on the grounds that the mother and father, in driving 
the automobile to Texas, were employees of the son and the 
mother could not recover for negligence of the fellow servant. 
The Supreme Court on appeal held that the District Court 
erred in its holding that the mother and father were employees 
of the son. It held that an independent contractorship relation 
was involved, and not an employer-employee relationship. 
Chief Justice Wolfe, in an excellent concurring opinion, points 
out the distinction between the two relationships and states 
that clearly the relationship was not one of employer-em-
ployee. He states that while it does not seem to fit exactly 
into the independent contractorship, still, where public policy 
does not dictate that the doctrine of respondeat superior 
apply, it should be placed in the independent contractorship 
even though it does not have exactly all the aspects of that 
relationship. 
In considering this issue, let us bear in mind that the 
employer-employee relationship is a contractual relationship. 
It is created out of a binding contract between two persons. 
There is no more fundamental principle in the law than this: 
A binding contract must be supported by consideration. De-
fendant in its brief states that the existence of control by one 
party over the person performing the services is an essential 
and almost determining factor in the employment relationship. 
All of the cases cited by defendant in its brief deal with the 
question of control, and we have no quarrel with any of them. 
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Note, however, that in each of them there was a binding con-
tract and the question of control was considered in each of 
them as an aid in determining whether or not that binding 
contract created a master-servant relationship or some other 
relationship. 
When the courts speak of the question of control, they 
speak of the legal right to control, and this legal right can 
only come out of a binding contract. For every legal right, 
there is a correlative legal duty, a breach of which gives rise 
to a legal cause of action. When there is a legal right to con-
trol, there is a correlative legal duty to obey. If, then, Pearce 
had the legal right, for example, to order Oberhansley to 
stop at Morgan for sandwiches and if Oberhansley instead 
stopped at Echo, Pearce could sue him for violating his legal 
duty. Now, obviously, under our evidence in this case, 
Pearce would not be able to sue Oberhansley, for the simple 
reason that Oberhansley had not bound himself to any legal 
duty toward Pearce. He had not entered into any binding 
contract. An essential element is missing--consideration. 
The Utah Supreme Court uses similar reasoning in the 
case of Gleason vs. Salt Lake City, et al 94 Utah 1, 74 P. 2d 
1225, which case is cited by defendant in its brief. The 
question involved was whether. or not a fireman was an em-
ployee of the store company where he worked to extinguish 
a fire. The Court considers whether or not the fire depart-
ment was employed by the store, and it says: 
" ... There was no binding contract in advance. The 
Fire Department was under no obligation to do the 
work and could have withdrawn at any time without 
liability for breach of contract . . . . Because there 
10 
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was no contract, the company could have requested 
the defendant to desist at any time without liability 
to it for breach of contract." 
And: 
"There being no contract between the company and 
the city or the men of the Fire Department, either 
could have withdrawn without liability to the other. 
The company could have said to the firemen when 
they came to pump the shaft, 'We do not want you 
to do the job, you may go', or the fire chief could have 
withdrawn the men at any time. It is argued that be-
cause the company could have directed the men to 
desist from doing the work at any time during its per-
formance, this gave it such power of control that it is 
liable for their negligence. That, however, is not the 
sort of control referred to in the cases which impose 
liability on the principal or master for the negligence 
of the servant. The kind of control necessary to im-
pose liability is the right of control over the details 
of the work, or the means or method of its perform-
ance. The fact that the fire chief could have called 
his men back to the station or could have refused to 
do the work at the request of the company but em-
phasizes the independence of the Fire Department, 
and tends to exclude any relationship of master and 
servant between the company and the firemen." 
And in Bingham City, et al, vs. Industrial Commission, cited 
and quoted above, the court, after pointing out why the 
volunteer fireman was not an employee within the meaning 
of the Workmen's Compensation Act, goes on and says this: 
" ... The deceased was not in the service of the city 
under any appointment or contract of hire or at all. 
There were no contractual relations between them 
11 
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whatever .... There was no legal duty or obligation 
on the part of one to the other. There was therefore 
no relationship of master and servant or employer and 
1 " emp oyee ... 
It is true that wages are not always essential to create 
an employment relationship. It is also true that the important 
element to consider is the question of right to control. How-
ever, if there be no wages or other benefit flowing to the doer 
there can be no right to control, and there can be no employ-
ment because there is no binding contract. 
3. Plaintiff was not an employee within the meaning of 
the defendant's insurance policy. We think this is the 
determinative issue on this employment question. This issue 
has not been touched upon by the defendant in its brief. 
We commence consideration of this issue with the univer-
sally accepted principle that words used in an insurance policy 
are to receive their ordinary meaning, but when a word is 
ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning, it must 
receive that meaning which is most adverse to the insurance 
company and most favorable to the insured. That principle 
is used in the cases cited and quoted hereinafter. 
The question was not directly involved in the case 
Jewtr.aw vs. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 131 
NYS 745. However, because of the language used in that 
case, we believe that it is a good introduction to the issue and 
we quote it at length. In this case, the insured was a costume 
man and he had to make a trip to Ottawa, Canada, from New 
York to get costumes for a winter carnival. He asked the 
plaintiff to go along with him to help, and he agreed to pay 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the plaintiff's expenses. It was understood that the plain-
tiff was to be paid wages for the trip, but he had not actually 
been paid at the time of the trial. In considering whether 
or not the plaintiff was an employee of the insured, the court 
said: 
"What employment might be regarded as sufficient 
to hold a man a nongratuitous passenger in an auto-
mobile traveling in Ontario under the Ontario statute 
might be something less, or at least different, from 
what might be construed to be 'employment' in an ex-
clusion clause relieving an insurance company of re-
sponsibility to its insured. When these legal areas 
are looked at, it is to be seen that they are not con-
gruent in the geometric sense and therefore the answer 
given to one is not inevitably the answer to be given 
to the other. 
"The policy covered Davis (the insured) generally 
for all liability which a court might impose on him for 
injuries arising out of the operation of his truck, un-
less the exclusion became operative. Under familiar 
principles, the exclusion must be construed strictly 
against the carrier . 
"Since we have no New York statute avoiding liability 
for negligence to a gratuitous guest, the question of 
when a rider in a vehicle may be something more than 
a guest but something less than an employee of the 
owner of the vehicle seems not to have been passed 
on; but cases have arisen in which consideration has 
been given the question of what is 'employment' and 
how it influences other effective legal relations. An 
examination of these cases suggests that the problem 
in the action now before us ought to be treated as an 
issue of fact. 
13 
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"One such case is Ferro vs. Leopold Sinsheimer Estate, 
Inc., 256 NY 398, 176 NE 817, 818, upon which, as we 
have noted before, both sides of this controversy have 
relied at one time or another. A boy about thirteen 
years old had been occasionally asked by the super-
intendent of a building to do some errands and small 
odd jobs for which the superintendent from his own 
funds gave him 'a little money, a mere gratuity'. The 
boy was injured while helping the superintendent clean 
an elevator cable. 
"The action was dismissed at Trial Term because the 
court there was of opinion the relationship was one 
of employment, to which the \Vorkmen's Compensation 
Law applied; but the court of appeals held it was 
not employment within the statute and that an em-
ployment relationship had not been 'contemplated or 
established' . . . 
"In Mandatto vs. Hudson Shoring Company, 229 NY 
624 129 NE 933, cited supra, the distinction between 
a contractual relation of employment and· a 'casual' 
and 'voluntary' rendering of a 'slight' service or favor 
for which a gratuity is given was recognized. The 
expressions used are from the dissenting opinion in 
this court, 190 App. Div. 71, 179 NYS 458, adopted 
by the court of appeals on reversal. Quite similar 
language is found in Lazar vs. Steinberg, 269 App. 
Div. 760, 54 NYS 2d 859. These cases suggest that 
the actual relation between J ewtrew and Davis in 
making their trip together to Ottawa could be found, 
as a question of fact, not to have come within New 
York's legal conception of what is 'employment'. 
"When we turn to decisions in other States in cases 
quite closely approaching the one before us under 
guest statutes we seem to find some further support 
for the view we take of what disposition ought to be 
14 
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made of the case. In Sills vs. Sorensen, 19 2 Wash. 
318, 73 P. 2d 798, the assured invited plaintiff to 
make a trip in his automobile to act as a witness for 
assured on the payment of a bill, for which service the 
plaintiff was given $2 by the assured. Injured in an 
accident the plantiff recovered against the assured 
under a complaint which avoided the effect of the 
Washington guest statute by pleading he was em-
ployed by the assured. 
"But the Washington court held that plaintiff was 
not precluded by the judgment in the main action from 
showing that this was not 'employment' as used in the 
policy of insurance excluding liability to employees of 
its assured injured in the course of their employment 
in the business of the assured. The court was of opinion 
there was an absence of such control over a man hired 
to become a witness as to avoid the conventional effect 
of employment and treated him as an independent 
contractor . . . . 
"Where a man agreed to drive a truck from one city 
to another for a corpo_ration of which his employer in 
another business was an officer, without compensation 
and without consideration other than two meals, it 
was held by the same court that he was not an 'em-
ployee' of the owner of the truck within an exclusion 
provision of the policy, Braley Motor Co. vs North-
western Casualty Co., 184 Wash. 47, 49 P·. 2d 911. 
It was further held that under the form of submission 
of the negligence action in which recovery had there 
been allowed against the insured the injured party was 
not deemed conclusively to have been found to be an 
employee of the owner of the truck. 
"In Standard Accident Ins. Co. vs. Swift, 92 NH 364, 
31 A. 2d 66, a student in a school summer camp made 
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a part paYffi:ent of tuition by assuming additional res-
ponsibilities in the work program which all students 
at the camp shared. In the course of voluntarily as-
suming suc4 additional responsibilities he was injured. 
The New Hampshire court held that this did not fall 
within the 'employee' exclusion clause of a liability 
policy. 
"The same court construed similarly an injury sus-
tained by a relative of the assured's riding to the as-
sured's home in the North with the understanding she 
should work for the assured a month later, the assured 
bearing the expenses of the trip from the South on 
which the injury was incurred. It was held that this 
was not 'employment' within the scope of the policy. 
Merchants Mutual Casualty Company vs. Manzer, 93 
NH 34, 35 A. 2d 392. See also Home Indemnity Co. 
vs. Village of Plymouth, 146 Ohio St. 96, 64 NE 2d 
248." (parenthesis added) 
In Braley Motor Company, Inc. vs. Northwestern Cas-
ualty Company, a Washington case reported in 49 P. 2d 911, 
the injured person had worked for Braley Motor Company, 
Inc., the insured, for a period of several years selling auto-
mobiles on a commission basis. A short time before the ac-
cident, the injured person left this employment and went to 
work for a Mr. Braley, the president of the insured corpo-
ration, selling oysters. It was necessary that Braley Motor 
Company, Inc. pick up a truck in Seattle, \~Vashington, and 
arrangements were made between Braley and the injured 
person for the two of them to drive together from Aberdeen, 
the home town, to Seattle and pick up the truck, and then one 
would drive the car back and the other one the truck. No 
consideration or compensation was given for the trip; how-
ever, Braley bought the injured person his breakfast and 
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luncheon on the trip. The court held that there was no em-
ployment relationship in the following words: 
" . . . . It is evident that the word 'employed' was 
used in the insurance policy, in its ordinary and natural 
sense, as implying the relationship of master and ser-
vant. The service rendered by Kantonem (the injured 
person) was casual and gratuitous. He was driving 
the car wholly as an accommodation to the appellant, 
even though he may have had some incidental benefit 
in the way of pleasure or the hope of future business. 
In construing the language of the policy, if construc-
tion is needed, we are to keep in mind the familiar 
rule, that the construction will be adopted which is 
the most favorable to the insured. 
" 'There is another principle applying to contracts of 
insurance to the effect that if they are so drawn as to 
require interpretation and fairly susceptible of two 
different conclusions, the one will be adopted most 
favorable to the insured and will be liberally con-
strued in favor of the object to be accomplished, and 
conditions and provisions therein will be strictly con-
strued against the insurer as they are issued upon 
printed forms prepared by experts at the instance of 
the insurer, in the preparation of which the insured 
has no voice (citing cases).' " (parenthesis added) 
In Rickenbaker vs. Layton, et al, a South Carolina case, 
59 Fed. Sup. 156, the injured person was a rural mail carrier. 
The insured asked him to accompany him (insured) on a 
trip around the rural mail route to show him where several of 
the insured's customers lived. The trip was taken and after 
the injured person had pointed out the residences of the 
various customers, the parties left the route and drove to a 
small nearby town, and then the accident occured on the way 
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home. It was claimed that the injured person was an em-
ployee of the insured. The insured testified that although 
no definite arrangements were made as to payment of com-
pensation, he expected and anticipated that he would have to 
pay the injured person for the services rendered by him and 
he expected to take it out of his expense account. The court 
held that there was no contract of employment. It stated: 
"A contract of employment, like any other contract, 
can only arise out of a meeting of the minds of the 
contracting parties; and such a contract usually in-
volves the agreement of one party to render services 
or labor for the benefit oi another, who in turn be-
comes obligated, expressly or by implication, to pay a 
consideration therefor. The testimony in this case 
hardly warrants the inference that such a relationship 
has been established between the insured and the plain-
tiff as of the time of the accident. The fact that no 
compensation was agreed upon, or ever asked by, or 
paid or offered to the plaintiff, for whatever he may 
have done on the afternoon in question, although five 
years have now elapsed, lends some support to plain-
tiff's contention that he was not at any time an em-
ployee of the insured ... " 
The court also says: 
" . . . . in the construction of insurance contracts, 
that meaning should be attributed to the language used 
which ordinarly is given to such language, unless it 
is susceptible of more than one reasonable construc-
tion, in which case it will be given that construction 
which is most favorable to the insured ... To say that 
a casual employee of the insured, who was not at 
the time of his injury engaged in any business of the 
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insured, and had not been for two hours, is excluded 
from coverage would be to give the language of the 
policy a strained construction or else to resolve a pos-
sible ambiguity in favor of the insurer and against 
the insured.'' 
In Daub, et al, vs. Maryland Casualty Co., 148 SW 2d 58, 
the plaintiff, age sixteen, performed work for insureds about 
their house. On one occasion he raked leaves for a morning 
and was paid twenty-five cents and his dinner. A few weeks 
later he grubbed out a stump in the back yard and was paid 
$1.50 and his lunch. Shortly thereafter, insured contacted 
the boy at his home and asked him to rake leaves, and he was 
injured while so working. The policy insured against liability 
to "any person or persons not employed by insureds". 
The court held the boy was not an employee within the 
meaning of the policy, using the following language: 
"The word 'employed' is capable of a great variety 
of interpretations, and is therefore subject to restrict-
ions and limitations arising from its use in connection 
with other words, or from the context of the contract 
or statement in which it appears. The word as used 
in the policy in suit here obviously imports the relation 
of master and servant or employer and employee, but 
it does not necessarily import every sort of such 
relationship . . . . . The restrictive words 'not em-
ployed' are susceptible of many meanings, and there-
fore necessarily introduce ambiguity and leave the 
clause open to construction. And that construction 
most favorable to the insured must be adopted. 
"The word 'employee', which is the correlative of em-
ployer, is commonly used as signifying continuous 
service, or as designating a person who gives his whole 
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time and services to another for a financial considera-
tion, or as designating a person who performs services 
for another for a financial consideration, exclusive of 
casual employment, or a person in constant and con-
tinuous service, or a person having some permanent 
employment or position, or a person who renders 
regular and continued services, not limited to a par-
ticular transaction, or to a person having a fixed tenure 
or position. The words, employed and employee, as 
used in insurance policies, generally denote regular 
employment, as distinguished from occasional, incid-
ental, or casual employment .... (citing cases) 
"It is clear that Winton Meyer, at the time of his in-
jury, was not regularly employed by plaintiffs, or a 
regular employee of plaintiffs, and he is therefore not 
excluded from the coverage of the policy.'' (paren-
thesis added) 
In Sills, et ux, vs. Sorenson (Fireman's Fund Indemnity 
Co., Garnishee), a Washington case reported in 73 P. 2d 798, 
insured's wages had been attached, and he desired to travel 
to a neighboring city to pay the creditor. He asked the plain-
tiff to accompany him and act as witness to the payment and 
agreed to pay him and did pay him $2.00 as wages for the 
services. On the return trip the accident occurred, causing 
injury to plaintiff. The exclusion provision was the same as 
that in our present case. The court held there was no em-
ployment, and it said: 
"We proceed from the well-established and oft-re-
peated principle in the law of insurance that, if the 
policy be so drawn as to require interpretation 
and its language is fairly susceptible of different con-
clusions, that construction which is the most favorable 
to the assured in affording him protection under the 
policy will be adopted. (citing cases) 
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"Both parties concede, and likewise proceed upon the 
theory, that Sills (plaintiff) was actually paid the 
sum of $2 for the service to be rendered by him on the 
trip ..... 
"What, then, was Sills' relationship to Sorenson (as-
sured)? Respondent contends that he was an em-
ployee in the legal sense of a servant. Appellant con-
tends that his employment was that of an independ-
ent contractor. It appears certain that he must fall 
within one or the other of these two classifications. 
"The word 'employee', though more euphonious, has 
the same legal significance as the word 'servant'. It 
imports some sort of continuous service rendered for 
wages or salary and subject to the direction of the em-
ployer or master as to how the work shall be done." 
(parenthesis added) 
The court then considers the distinction between employee 
and independent contractor, as applied to the facts, and con-
cludes that plaintiff was an independent contractor and not 
an employee. 
Not strictly in point, but of considerable interest, is the 
case of B & H Passmore Metal & Roofing Co., Inc. vs. New 
Amsterdam Casualty Company, 147 Fed. 2d 536. Chief 
Justice Phillips of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals gives 
an excellent discussion of the difference in interpreting the 
word "employee" as used in compensation acts and the word 
as used in insurance policies. In this case, the deceased 
regularly worked as a roofer for the insured. He and other 
employees were provided transportation to and from their 
places of work by their employer, but they were not paid for 
the time consumed in so traveling. Death resulted from an 
accident occuring while returning in the employer's truck from 
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a job at the end of the work day. The court held that whereas 
the language of a workmen's compensation act should be liber-
ally construed in favor of the injured workman and all reason-
able doubt as to its meaning resolved in his favor, the ex-
clusion clause of an insurance policy must be strictly con-
strued against the insurer. The court then held that the 
death did not occur while deceased was engaged in the business 
of the insured, and that the exclusion provision was inap-
plicable. 
In Bean et al vs. Gibbens, et al, a Kansas case, 265 P. 2d 
1023, the defendant insurance company defended under 
an exclusion provision which provided that the policy did not 
apply to bodily injury, sickness, disease or death of any em-
ployee of the insured while engaged in the employment. The 
facts were that the insured was driving a truck and the truck 
broke down and he was in the process of towing it into a gar-
age when he asked the deceased to assist him by drving the 
truck that was being towed for him. The deceased agreed to 
do so, and the insured instructed him fully as to how the 
truck was to be driven and directed and controlled him therein. 
The court held that the deceased was not an employee of the 
insured. It uses the following language: 
"The real question was the fundamental relationship 
between Gibbens and Wilber under all the surround-
ing facts and circumstances. The word 'employee' as 
defined in the New Century Dictionary is: 
" 'A person who is in the employ or regular work-
ing service of another, as a clerk, workman, etc.' 
"Black's Law Dictionary, 3d Ed., at page 657, defines 
the word 'employee' as follows: 
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"'This word "is from the French, but has become 
somewhat naturalized in our language. Strictly 
and etymologically, it means 'a person employed', 
but in practice in the French language, it ordin-
arily is used to signify a person in some official 
employment, and as generally used with us, 
though perhaps not confined to any official em-
ployment, it is understood to mean some per-
manent employment or position." ' 
"On the same page Mr. Black defines the word 'em-
ploy' as follows: 
'To engage in one's service; to use as an agent 
or substitute in transacting business; to commis-
sion and intrust with the management of one's 
affairs; and, when used in respect to a servant or 
hired laborer, the term is equivalent to hiring, 
which implies a request and a contract for a com-
pensation, and has but this one meaning when 
used in the ordinary affairs and business of life.' 
"Also 56 CJS, Master and. Servant, Paragraph 1, page 
2 7, defines 'employee' as follows: 
' "Employee has also been defined as a person in 
constant and continuous service, one who per-
forms services for another for a financial con-
sideration exclusive of casual employment.' 
The court in concluding approved the following con-
clusion made by the trial court: 
" .... the task performed by said Wilbur Leroy Bean 
for defendap.t was occasional, incidental, casual and 
a neighborly act." 
and held that the exclusion provision did not apply. 
You will note that in most of the cases above quoted, the 
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facts brought the parties closer to an employment situation 
than existed in our present case. Yet in each of them the 
court, relying in part upon the familiar rule of interpretation 
of insurance contracts, finds that no employment within the 
meaning of the word as contemplated by the parties to the in-
surance contract existed. 
Assume for the sake of argument there is some efficacy 
to defendant's argument on this question and that there are 
instances where the facts in this case can be stretched to em-
brace an employment relationship. Nonetheless, the word 
"employee" is normally defined as a person who does service 
for another under a contract of hire. Thus, in Stricker vs. 
Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 603, 188 P. 849, the Utah 
court, after quoting the Workmen's Compensation Act defin-
ition of "employee" says: 
"The statutory definition adds nothing to the gener-
ally accepted definition of 'employee'. An 'employee' 
is one who works for and under the control of another 
for hire." 
Assume that definition were the unusual one rather than 
the one generally accepted. Still, under the rule of inter-
pretation of insurance contracts quoted above, it is the one 
that should be adopted by the court, and in this case Ober-
hansley just doesn't fit into that definition. The service 
rendered by him was a casual, gratuitous, neighborly act and 
neither authority nor logic can make him an employee. We 
submit, therefore, that the court did not err in entering its 
Finding No. 5. 
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POINT II. 
The Court did not err in Entering its Finding No. 6 
This point involves a question of whether or not the 
court should have found as a matter of law that the insured 
failed to cooperate with the insurance company, and hence 
that the insurance company is relieved of liability under its 
policy. 
Counsel for defendant in its brief would have the court 
ignore the conduct of the insurance company in considering 
this point. They say that the court made no finding on the 
matter and therefore it is not before the Supreme Court. The 
court made a finding on the ultimate fact, and the ultimate fact 
G C b.l' i. «JJ Tl ol1 
was whether or not there was a failure of eoHsKfei=atioa. It 
was not required to make a finding on any evidentiary fact, 
and the reason or reasons why it concluded that there was no 
lack of cooperation would be evidentiary. 
The question of cooperation is a two-faceted question. It 
is impossible to consider that question without examining 
both the conduct of the insured and of the insurance company. 
Obviously, an insurance company cannot sit back and make no 
requests for cooperation and then complain because the in-
sured failed to cooperate. Obviously, if it makes no request 
that the insured appear at the trial, it can't complain because 
the insured fails to appear. The insurance company must 
make some effort, and whenever in the law some effort is 
required, the law requires that that effort be a reasonable 
one. And by definition, reasonable effort means due diligence. 
The question, then, is a two-faceted one: ( 1) What, if any-
thing, did the insurance company do to obtain the coopera-
tion, and ( 2) In what manner, if at all, did the insured fail 
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to cooperate? We certainly do not agree that the conduct of 
the insurance company is in the nature of an estoppel which 
must be pleaded and proved by plaintiff. The defendant 
raised this defense: "We sought our insured's cooperation 
and he refused it." That defense placed in issue the question 
of how defendant sought its insured's cooperation. 
This logic finds support in authority. The following lan-
guage from Traders & General Ins. Co. vs. Rudco Oil & Gas 
Co., 129 Fed. 2d 621, is typical of the language we find in the 
cases: 
" .... the rights of the insurer (to control the de-
fense of a suit on behalf of the insured) are not ab-
solute, they are subject to moderation by the rule of 
right and justice. Exclusive authority to act does not 
necessarily mean the right to act arbitrarily (citing 
cases). The right to control the litigation in all of 
its aspects carries with it the correlative duty to ex-
ercise diligence, intelligence, good faith, honest and 
conscientious fidelity to the common interest of the 
parties (citing cases). When the insurer undertakes 
the defense of the claim or suit, it acts as the agent of 
its assured in virtue of the contract of ins11rance be-
tween the parties, and when a conflict of interest 
arises between the insurer, as agent, and assured, as 
principal, the insurer's conduct will be subject to 
closer scutiny than that of the ordinary agent because 
of his adverse interest (citing cases)" (parenthesis 
added) 
In Jensen vs. Eureka Casualty Company, 10 Cal. App. 
2d 706, 52 P. 2d 540, the insured made a report of his ac-
cident to the insurance company. When he was served with 
the complaint and summons, he delivered them to the in-
surance company, and promptly responded to the notice sent 
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to his given address to appear and verify the answer. Then 
several months later, when the attorney desired to take his 
deposition, he could not be found and he was not located 
and did not appear at the trial. The court held that the in-
sured had not failed to cooperate with the insurance company, 
and it used the following language: 
'' ..... the violation of the cooperation clause of 
such an insurance policy by the insured, where the 
insurer is substantially prejudiced thereby, is a valid 
defense is well settled (citing cases). This rule, how-
ever, must be interpreted to assume that the insurer, 
diligently and · in good faith, has complied with the 
terms and conditions of th~ policy." (parenthesis ad-
ded) 
To the same effect, see Pigg vs. International ldemnity Com-
pany, a California case reported at 261 P. 486. 
In Rinnard vs. Northwestern Mutual Fire Association, 
187 Wash. 47, 59 P. 2d 1072, it was held not to constitute a 
breach of the cooperation clause of the policy where the in-
surer had informed the assured that his wife was a party to 
the action, and in response to a request by the assured, re-
fused to accept the obligation of paying the assured other 
than his expenses in attending the trial, without compensation 
for the assured's lost time from work or for his wife's ex-
penses, and where no steps were taken by the insurer to 
secure the deposition of the assured. 
In Finkle vs. Western Automobile Insurance Company, 
a Missouri case reported at 26 SW 2d 843, the suit against 
the insurance company brought by the injured party who 
had recovered judgment against the insured was defended on 
27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the grounds of want of cooperation. The insured turned the 
summons over to the insurance company, and shortly there-
after, the insurance company attorney took his deposition. At 
that time, the attorney told the insured they would have to be 
present at the trial to testify. Thereafter, at another meet-
ing with the insureds, the attorney again impressed upon 
them the importance of their being present at the trial. The 
insureds left the state without informing the insurance com-
pany and never communicated with the attorney or with the 
company. Two weeks before trial date, the attorney wrote 
the insureds, advising them of the trial date and asking 
them to communicate with him at once. This letter was re-
turned to the attorney undelivered, and the company began 
an immediate investigation to learn the whereabouts of the 
insureds but could not locate them for trial. The court held 
there was not a lack of cooperation, and it said: 
"What constitutes 'cooperation' within a policy re-
quiring the assured to cooperate with the insurer in 
the defense of an action brought against him is usually 
a question of fact (citing cases). 
''Now in the case at bar, so long as they were in the 
city, defendants seem to have cooperated very fully 
with the garnishee, and to have acceded to every re-
quest for assistance which its counsel made. They 
came willingly to Teasdale's (the attorney) office 
when he expressed a desire to go over the case as a 
whole with them; they presented themselves in re-
sponse to the notice to take depositions, and, if they 
were not cross-examined by Teasdale, it was through 
no fault of their own ..... 
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"Under such a situation, it appears that there are two 
ultimate questions to be determined: First, whether 
the assured was guilty of bad faith in leaving; and, 
second, whether the company exercised reasonable 
diligence in ascertaining his whereabouts, and in pro-
curing his attendance at the trial, or his deposition for 
use in lieu of personal appearance. 
" .... we think it is an open question as to whether 
the garnishee used due diligence toward securing 
their attendance at court . . . . . 
"Of all the reported cases that we have been able 
to find, the one perhaps most favorable to the garn-
ishee is Schoenfeld vs. New Jersey Fidelity and Plate 
Glass Insurance Company, supra. There the assured 
had left this country for Russia, leaving no address 
where he might be communicated with, and, when the 
company was unable to locate him, it withdrew from 
the case, and allowed judgment to go against him by 
default. It is significant, however, that the company 
withdrew from the defense two months before the 
default was taken, and that its attempts to locate the 
assured had occurred over a long period of time prior 
thereto. Even upon such a state of facts, the court 
held that the question of the company's good faith 
was for the jury to determine; and, if there was a jury 
question present in the Schoenfeld case, how much 
more pointed is the issue in the case at bar . . . . " 
(parenthesis added) 
In Durbin vs. Lord, an Illinois case reported in 68 N E 2d 
537, there was held to be no lack of cooperation when the in-
surer did almost everything that could reasonably be done 
to secure the attendance at trial of insured, who had left the 
jurisdiction and could not be loca'ted. 
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In Murphy vs. Hopkins, et al, a South Dakota case in 4 
NW 2d 801, in response to a request from the insurer that she 
appear at the trial, the insured wrote two letters. In the 
first she said that she had offered to have her deposition 
taken before leaving the town of trial and it was refused, and 
since the case had been continued once, she didn't see why 
it couldn't be continued again. In the second letter she said 
she couldn't come because of financial considerations. The 
insurer made no offer to pay her expenses, and the court held 
there was no lack of cooperation when she failed to appear 
at the trial. 
In Strode vs. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co., (Ken-
tucky), 102 F. Supp. 240, the trial against insured was set 
for January 10, 1950. It was then continued, and the in-
sured was so advised. On March 27th, an attorney for in-
sured wrote the attorneys for the insurance company, ad-
vising them the insured's employment position would be 
jeopardized if she left town to appear for the trial, but she 
would be willing to give her deposition. The insurance attor-
neys acknowledged the letter and advised the atto.mey it would 
be vital for insured to attend the trial in person, as she was 
the only witness for the defendant. An offer was made to 
pay her expenses to the trial. The insured's attorney then 
wrote the insurance company attorneys that she could not 
attend in person because it would mean her job. The in-
surance company attorneys then wrote as follows: "If Mrs. 
Campbell (insured) refuses to attend the trial as indicated 
in your letter, we will withdraw fron1 the defense of her case 
and not be responsible for any judgment rendered." 
The case was set for trial on May 2nd. On April 27th, 
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the insurance attorneys wrote to the insured's attorney, with 
whom they had been corresponding, advising him of the trial 
date. They also wrote to another attorney in the same town, 
requesting of him that he try to locate the insured. This at-
torney wrote and advised that the insured had left town and 
left no forwarding address. When the insured failed to appear, 
the attorneys withdrew and defended the garnishment action 
of the grounds of failure to cooperate. The court said: 
"The intentions of the parties at the time of inception 
of the contract was that there should be mutual as-
sistance in defending any effort to obtain money from 
Mrs. Campbell growing out of her operation of the 
car described in the policy. The legal part of any 
claim for damages was to be left to the insurance 
company. It was to hold her harmless to the extent 
of the terms of the policy and to furnish all legal 
counsel required and to notify her when she was 
needed to assist. That was certainly the spirit and 
reasonable interpretation of the terms of the policy. 
"It appears from the record that the defendant was 
only looking for an excuse to abandon it.s insured's 
case. Mrs. Campbell had given a perfectly rational 
explanation of why she could not attend the trial. 
"Liability insurance between the company and its 
insured presupposes that the company will become the 
champion of its insured when misfortune, in the way 
of accident, overtakes her and she is sued. . . . . It 
is something of a trust relationship where the interests 
of the insured and no~ the interest or convenience of 
the insurance company are paramount. 
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"An offer in compromise is shown to have been made 
by the plaintiff to the insurance company in the former 
case of Strode vs. Campbell, S!Jpra, before judgment 
in the Court of Appeals. Mrs. Campbell was not 
even advised that such offer had been made. This 
is not the kind of cooperation from the company which 
the insured had a right to expect. 
"I am convinced, upon a careful consideration of the 
whole record, that Mrs. Campbell showed no suffic-
ient lack of cooperation ~thin the meaning of the 
policy to justify the company in abandoning her case. 
"It is apparent that the casualty company was much 
more concerned in finding an excuse to set up a legal 
barrier between it and its client than it was to ful-
fill its just obligations to save her harmless . . . . 
"I must conclude that the defendant did not discharge 
its obligations under the terms of the policy to its in-
sured, Mrs. Campbell, by making a genuine effort 
to protect her rights .... " 
The Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming this decision, 
( 202 Fed. 2d 599), ordered striken the criticism of the insur-
ance attorneys, and we approve. No one who knows them 
would question the integrity of the insurance attorneys in our 
present case. It seems to us the evil lies in the insurance 
arrangement that places attorneys in the position where they 
are attorneys for one person and are hired by and work for 
another person whose interests they must watch out for and 
whose interests are adverse to those of the client. Also, per-
haps some blame should be placed with the insurance com-
panies who place attorneys in such an impossible position and 
then seek to take advantage of it. There is certainly good 
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sense in the rule that requires the conduct of an insurer to be 
closely scrutinized when its interests become adverse to the 
insured and that requires that they perhaps lean over back-
wards to be fair in such circumstances. Certainly, insurance 
companies are entitled to protection against fraud. But they 
should not be protected when they, by mistake or design or 
lack of proper diligence, create or foster the fraudulent situa-
tion. 
We have reviewed all of the case cited on this point by de-
fendant in its brief. We believe that none of those cases is 
helpful in determining this case. Those cases are helpful in 
determining the effect of a failure to cooperate, but they are 
not helpful in determining what constitutes a failure to co-
operate. For example, counsel states that the Coleman case, 
quoted on page 3 2 of defendants brief, is persuasive, and 
reliance is placed upon it by defendant. Compare the facts 
in that case to the facts in ours. There the insured was a 
corporate pharmacy and it was sued for making an erroneous 
prescription. The insurer took over the defense in accord-
ance with the policy. Its attorney wrote to the secretary of 
the insured corporation, the man who had apparently made 
the improper prescription, and requested that he appear and 
sign the answer to the complaint. The secretary refused to 
sign the answer and refused to talk to the attorney about the 
case. The atorney then wrote letters to the insured request-
ing that some other officer come in and sign the answer. 
These letters were ignored. The attorney then wrote request-
ing that a conference on the matter be held at any time and 
place of insured's choosing. These letters were ignored. The 
insured positively refused to cooperate in any manner unless 
the insurance company would agree to assume complete 
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liability regardless of the amount of recovery. Certainly 
this was, as Justice Cardozo stated, a default involving more 
than just sluggishness or indifference. 
Admittedly, too, some of the cases cited herein are not 
strictly in point on the facts, although the Strode case seems 
awfully close. In the Strode case, the conduct of the insured 
seems more uncooperative than the conduct of Pearce, and 
certainly the insurance company in that case made more effort 
than the insurance company did in our present case. In any 
event, the cases cited herein seem to us to present the prin-
ciples upon which this case should be decided. Since each 
case must be decided upon its facts, and since the facts seem 
so important in deciding this point, let us again briefly list 
categorically what each party to this insurance contract did. 
Pearce: 
1. Notified the insurer of the accident. 
2. Submitted the suit papers to insurer when served. 
3. Appeared on request before the insurer and gave 
a written statement. 
4. Appeared before insurer's attorney on request. 
5. Left town without notifying insurer. 
6. Upon receipt of a letter from insurer, notified 
it that his employment situation prevented his 
being at the triaJ at that time. 
7. Took no further action, although he received 
Attorney Wixom's letter soon thereafter, and al-
though advised by his father that it was im-
portant he be there. 
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The Insurance Company: 
1. Wrote a registered letter to Pearce, telling him 
he had to appear at the trial. 
2. Received word from Pearce that he couldn't 
appear for the November trial because of his job 
situation. 
3. Although advised of Pearce's difficulty, told 
Pearce's father it was important that he come. 
4. Although advised of Pearce's difficulty, asked 
Mr. Wixom to request Pearce to come. 
5. Had a claims office forty miles from where 
Pearce lived and had agents that covered 
Pearce's town. 
6. Did nothing more. 
Now let us review briefly the explanations given by the 
two parties to this contract. 
Pearce: 
He was in line to be manager of the Ford agency and 
did become manager soon thereafter. He said leaving his 
job at the time in question would in fact have jeopardized his 
chances of promotion. "It was the worst possible time", he 
said. The situation was the same when he received word 
from Mr. Wixom and his father. He knew the insurance com-
pany had an office nearby and thought it would get in touch 
with him if everything wasn't all right. No explanation was 
ever made to him as to why it was important to attend the 
trial, how long it would take, the consequences of his not 
appearing, why the case could not be held at a time when his 
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promotion or job would not be jeopardized, or any other ex-
planation. Laymen don't appreciate the importance of these 
things. Pearce wasn't a lawyer-that's why laymen hire 
lawyers. That's one reason why Pearce had a lawyer in this 
case and had paid for that lawyer when he paid his insurance 
premiums. 
The Insurance Company: 
It says it didn't ask for a continuance because plaintiff's 
attorney would have objected and the court woudn't have 
granted it. Possibly the writer, representing the plaintiff, 
would have objected to a continuance, although I doubt it. 
Possibly the court would have refused the continuance, al-
though it is extremely doubtful. In any event, an effort might 
have been made. Defendant says Pearce never requested 
that they obtain a continuance. However, the defendant com-
pany and not Pearce had control of the suit. Pearce had con-
tracted away his right to handle the defense, and the insur-
ance company had assumed its policy right to do so. The 
defendant says in its brief that a roundabout rumor reached 
it that Pearce would not attend. We submit that the telephone 
call from Pearce the father was neither a rumor nor was it 
roundabout. It was direct communication in response to the 
registered letter sent by the defendant company. Defendant 
says its policy did not require it to send a representative of the 
company to visit Pearce, and besides, it wouldn't have done 
any good anyway. Whether or not the insurance policy which 
required the insurer to exercise due diligence and good faith in 
representing the insured imposed upon it the obligation of 
contacting the insured is a question that must be decided by 
the court. Would any attorney, having the normal fiduciary 
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responsibility to his client that is inherent in the attorney-
client relationship, and having received a communication from 
his client containing a reasonable excuse why he could not 
appear at the trial at a given date some six weeks or so prior 
to the trial date, have sat back and said, "Well, it won't do 
me any good to try to get a continuance. It won't do me any 
good to try to con tact him again, and so I '11 let it go.'' It is 
inconceivable! It appears from defendant's off-the-record 
statements in its brief that it assumed that Pearce would at-
tend the trial, even after receiving the communication from 
him that his employment situation made it impossible for 
him to do so. It appears that the defendant made a mistake, 
and it now seeks to impose the burden of that mistake upon 
the plaintiff. 
Defendant asserts that Pearce had no right to place his 
convenience above his contractual obligation. However, the 
record shows it was not a matter of convenience. After all, 
he did make his promotion soon after the trial was held, and 
it was a substantial promotion. 
Defendant suggests that Pearce should have advised de-
fendant that if a continuance were asked for, he would come 
at a later date. We submit that when Pearce advised de-
fendant it was impossible for him to attend the trial at the 
time set, he was in effect asking defendant to try to arrange 
for a different time. If there was any misunderstanding be-
tween insurer and insured, it was not the fault of insured. 
Pearce advised defendant of his inability to come and of the 
reason therefor, and thereafter defendant did absolutely 
nothing even reasonably calculated to clear up the situation. 
As a matter of fact, how simple it would have been for de-
fendant to have avoided this whole issue if it had made a 
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three minute telephone call to Pearce, or asked one of its 
Oakland adjusters to see Pearce some time when he was in 
Antioch, or written another letter advising and explaining 
the situation and inquiring further into the job situation and 
when Pearce would be able to come to the trial-doing any-
thing any attorney would do for a client in whose welfare he 
was truly interested. Nor is it an excuse to say that the con-
tract of insurance did not require it to do so. That contract 
established a fiduciary relationship and the defendant's ob-
ligations are measured by that relationship. Counsel's state-
ment in his brief that Pearce received "official" notice of the 
trial date is the key to the whole affair. We think we need 
not suggest to the court why that one and only letter from 
defendant to Pearce was registered. And as plaintiff's counsel 
in the original tort action, may we say that Pearce's presence 
at the trial would not have bothered us one bit. 
Defendant suggests that Pearce failed to cooperate as 
part of a large conspiracy between him and the plaintiff. 
In support of this contention, it says that plaintiff's brother 
changed his testimony at the trial and plaintiff and his 
brother and Pearce were all good friends. Defendant qualified 
as a legal expert an insurance adjuster who admitted he had 
never been to Ia w school, and this expert testified in his 
opinion the statements given by plaintiff's brother and Pearce 
constituted a complete defense to the original action. I ask 
Your Honors to read these statements to determine whether 
or not that is an accurate expert opinion. 
If in fact there are some discrepancies between Keith 
Oberhansley's statement given to the insurance adjuster and 
his testimony at the trial, it is not the first time that an in-
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surance adjuster in his quest for facts exonerating his insur-
ance company failed to obtain a complete picture of an ac-
cident. 
In Johnson vs. Johnson (ldemnity Insurance Company), 
a Minnesota case in 3 7 NW 2 d 1, a case in which the insured 
and the injured party were related by marriage, the court said: 
" . . . . Friendliness between the parties is no evidence 
of lack of cooperation. Neither is hostility necessary 
to cooperation." 
The fact that the insured and the injured person were 
brothers and that the insured employed an attorney to bring 
suit against himself on behalf of his injured brother was not 
held to show lack of cooperation in Levy vs. Idemnity In-
surance Company of North America, a Louisiana case in 8 
Southern 2d 774. 
It seems to plaintiff's counsel that this case carries rather 
dangerous implications. If the defendant's position on this 
matter of lack of cooperation is sustained by the court, it 
seems that it will open the door to all sorts of questionable 
practices on the part of insurers. It seems, also, that it will 
do something more serious than that-it seems that it will 
undermine the attorney-client relationship. If an insurance 
company representing a client in a law suit is required to do 
no more than the defendant company did in this case, then 
certainly no attorney representing any client in any law suit 
is required to do more, and the bars will be down on the rather 
sacred fiduciary duties of an attorney toward his client. 
The language of the court in MacClure vs. Accident & 
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Casualty Insurance Company, a North Carolina case in 49 SE 
2 d 7 4 2, seems pertinent. 
"The (cooperation) clause cannot be interpreted in a 
way that would make it a mere device to entrap the 
insured, or a technicality so arbitrarily weighted that 
without detriment to the insurer in the performance of 
its obligation to defend, it wipes out that obligation, 
which is the essence of the contract, and a duty wholly 
surrendered to the insurer by its terms. We are un-
able to adopt a theory so opposed to substantial just-
ice." (parenthesis added) 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS, ALSUP & RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
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